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 Pisang Mas (Musa acuminatacolla or banana) is one of the important commodities in 
East Java. This study discusses the impact of contract farming to the improvement of 
banana supply chain performance.The performance measurements of banana supply 
chain are revenue, oversupply, lost sales, and availability. Two models of supply chain 
are developed based on two types of contract farming, plasma-nucleus contract farming 
(Model 1) and sub-contract contract farming (Model 2). Those two modelsaresimulated 
using Vensim PLE software for 52 weeks (computer time). The simulation shows that 
the performance of the Model 2 is better than the Model 1. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Farming is one important sector in Indonesia economic and banana is one of the important commodities in 
East Java Indonesia. However in recents year’s number of imported bananas increasing. Local bananas have 
characteristics easy to decay and the price difference with imported bananas and local bananas are not 
significant. To improve competitiveness of local banana some efforts to reduce delivery time and logistic cost 
have to be conducted.   
 An appropriate supply chain strategy can be used to improve the local banana competitive advantage. Some 
countries have used a supply chian strategy to improve their competitiveness. Sopadang et al. (2012) concluded 
that 25% waste reduction of Longan in Thailand can be achieved by implementing best practice of supply chain. 
Wilson (1996) showed co-ordination in the supply chain for fresh product sector increase the competitive 
advantage of the products in Northern Europe.  One of supply chain strategies for fresh foods is a partnership. 
Hughes and Merton (1996) mentioned that partnership give benefit for the consumer, retailer and supplier.  One 
of partnership strategies is contract farming. Glover (1987) stated that contract farming has potential benefit for 
small farmers. Patrict (2004) stated that contract farming is one mechanism to improve the livelihood of rural 
smallholders and provides them with the benefits of economic liberalization. He analyzed some cases in 
Indonesia. Arumugam et al. (2010) examined factors that lead farmers to participate in the contract farming and 
Man and Nawi (2010) concluded that there are many improper contract farmings between farmers and 
hypermarkets.  
 In this paper we analyzed the impact of contract farming in banana supply chain in East Java Indonesia. 
Data are collected from field research and the supply chain system of existing conditions are developed using 
Vensim PLE then the existing supply chain model is validated. Two supply chain models with contract farming 
are introduced and analyzed using Vensim PLE.Vensim is simulation software for developing, analysis, and 
packaging system dynamic models. Vensim Personal Learning Edition (PLE) is a configuration of Vensim for 
classroom use and personal learning of system dynamics. 
 This paper is divided into four sections. The first section shows contribution of this research. The research 
methodology is explained in Section two. Result and discussion are explained in Section three and the 
conclusion is derived in Section four. 
 
Research methodology: 
 Multi echelon supply chains for Pisang Mas are commonly used to meet customer demand. Such a supply 
chain network must satisfy buyers’ demands at the lowest possible cost. In this research, we study and design an 
existing model of supply chain and causal loop for pisang mas from farmers of Lumajang city and the big 
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plantation in Malang to retail/traditional market/ fruit store. The data used in this model are from (Sanada et al., 
2014), interviews, and secondary data of the National Economic and Social Survey (SUSENAS).  
 An existing model is designed in a dynamic system. Daellenbach andMcNickle (2005) stated a dynamic 
system is a condition in which the behavior of the system is continuously changing / sustainable within a certain 
time. The depiction of a dynamic system through a diagram can be done by using a causal loop diagram to 
determine the behavior of a complex system.  
 Next, verification and validation of the current model are applied in order to obtain the right model. Then, 
the proposed model based on causal loop is designed in order to give the best result. In this research the models 
are solved using qualitative and quantitative approaches. Qualitative and quantitative approaches are acquired 
from causal loop diagram and simulation using VENSIM PLE, respectively. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 Causal loop diagrams are marked with a "+" and "-" for the two connected variables. The sign "+" describes 
the positive impact relationship if one variable increased in value and vice versa will have a negative impact for 
the “-“signs.In this model, we use farmers in Lumajang and the big plantation in Malang as producers, PT Sewu 
Segar Nusantara (PT SSN) as a distributor. They are major players in the distribution of banana to all areas of 
Indonesia, especially East Java. The farmers are clustered in Groups of farmer. Groups of farmes could sell their 
products to PT. SSN or Banana Farmers Association Seroja (APP Seroja). The traditional market, fruit store and 
retail are the suppliers of end customers. The retail of this research is PT Carrefour. Since there are price and 
demand mechanism, we compare the price using additional retails such as Hypermart, Ranchmart, and Hero. 
Data from SUSENAS shows that the demand of customer in Surabaya for pisang mas weekly as 12,230 kg up to 
13,000 kg (SUSENAS, 2010). The Causal Loopof supply chain for Pisang Mas from Lumajang and Malang can 
be seen in Appendix 1. We use dummy retail to accommodate the demand after reducing the Careefour’s 
demand fulfillment. The range of retail pisang mas’ demand is from 9,430 kgs to 9,500 kgs weekly to meet 
consumption rate in Surabaya. The harvest and actual demand data of the Farmers and Big Plantation of the 
model can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The Harvest and Actual Demand of Farmers and Big Plantation. 
Variable Distribution Type Distribution 
Input (kgs) 
Harvest Uniform Distribution Minimum value: 1.000 
Maximum value: 2.000 
Actual retail Demand in Surabaya Uniform Distribution Minimum value: 2.800 
Maximum value: 3.500 
Actual traditional market/fruit store Demand in 
Surabaya 
Uniform Distribution Minimum value: 1.200 
Maximum value: 1.500 
Harvest Uniform Distribution Minimum value: 7.700 
Maximum value: 8.800 
Actual dummy retail Demand Uniform Distribution Minimum value: 9.430 
Maximum value: 9.500 
 
 The value of rejection rate for each business player is different as shown in Table 2. It depends on the 
policy of each business player. Table 3 provides the production cost from each producer and the profit margin 
from each player.  
 
Table 2: The Rejection Rate of Supply Chain. 
Variable Distribution Type Distribution Inputs 
The rejection rate of Plantation Uniform distribution Minimum value: 0.8% 
Maximum value: 1.2% 
The rejection rate of distributor Uniform distribution Minimum value: 1% 
Maximum value: 3% 
The rejection rate of retail Uniform distribution Minimum value: 2% 
Maximum value: 3% 
The rejection rate of fruit store Uniform distribution Minimum value: 5% 
Maximum value: 7% 
The rejection rate of traditional market Uniform distribution Minimum value: 5% 
Maximum value: 7% 
The rejection rate of farmers Uniform distribution Minimum value: 3% 
Maximum value: 5% 
The rejection rate of processing Uniform distribution Minimum value: 1% 
Maximum value: 3% 
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Table 3: Production Cost and Profit Margin of Supply Chain. 
Variable The Input for Simulation 
Production cost/kgs Rp 1,375 
Profit margin of plantation 300% 
Profit margin of distributor for retail 100% 
Profit margin of distributor for fruit store 80% 
Production cost/kgs (farmer) Rp 1,250 
Profit margin of farmers to local traditional market 50% 
Profit margin of farmers 200% 
Profit margin of groups of farmers 20% 
Profit margin of APP Seroja 20% 
Profit margin of retail (Uniform distribution) Profit margin of retail 
Profit margin of fruit store (Uniform distribution) Profit margin of fruit store 
Profit margin of traditional market (Uniform distribution) Profit margin of traditional market 
 
Contract Farming on Banana Supply Chain Model: 
 This research develops two models of banana supply chain based on two types of contract farming. Those 
two types are plasma-nucleus and sub-contract. Plasma-nucleus involves an agricultural enterprise (the nucleus) 
who provides seed and the other needs of farmers or a group of farmers (plasma) and then buys their products. 
The nucleus also provides technical expertise that relevant to the commodity being produced. The nucleus in 
this model is Banana Farmers Association Seroja (APP Seroja). APP Seroja becomes an agent of supplier which 
has partnership with retail. Model 1 as shown in Appendix 2 is developed based on plasma-nucleus contract 
farming. 
 Sub-contract partnership is simpler than plasma-nucleus. Sub-contract involves groups of farmers having a 
contract to supply commodities directly to retail. The key player of this model is retail which has partnership 
with groups of farmers. The retailer does not provide any technical or management assistance to the farmers. 
The retailer guarantee to buy a specific volume of product in a specific time period such as daily or weekly at a 
specified quality standard. Model 2 as shown in Appendix 3 is developed based on sub-contract contract 
farming. Figure 1 shows the distribution flow of those two types of contract farming. 
 
 
 
(a) Plasma-nucleus (Model 1)(b)  Sub-contract (Model 2) 
 
Fig. 1: Two types of contract farming. 
 
Performances of Banana Supply Chain: 
 Model 1 and 2 are simulated using Vensim PLE software for 52 weeks (one year). The performance 
measurements of banana supply chain are revenue, lost sales, oversupply and availability. Table 4 and 5 show 
the performance of supply chain model 1 and2 for each criteria. Performance measurement from those tables 
show that model 2 has better performance than model 1 in the criteria of lost sales, oversupply and availability, 
but not in revenue. Model 1 shows that retail get the biggest revenue, but in model 2, the farmers get the biggest 
revenue. Although the overall revenue of supply chain in model 1 is higher than model 2, however in model 2 
farmers get the biggest revenue. This is very reasonable since the farmers are the most important player in 
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banana supply chain. Also, if the farmers gain higher revenue, they will be motivated to plant more bananas and 
will not be switched to other commodities. 
 
Table 4: Performance of Supply Chain Model 1. 
Player Performance 
Revenue 
(Rp) 
Lost Sales (Rp) Over supply (Rp) Availability 
(%) 
Farmers 955,116,000 494,215,000 29,559,300 0.657073 
Group of farmers 287,477,000 157,950,000 4,515,140 0.646982 
APP Seroja 339,288,000 197,624,000 8,084,300 0.631925 
Retail 1,059,700,000 491,666,000 37,390,700 0.683076 
Supply Chain 2,643,581,000 1,341,455,000 79,549,440 0.654764 
 
Table 5: Performance of Supply Chain Model 2. 
Player Performance 
Revenue (Rp) Lost Sales (Rp) Over supply (Rp) Availability (%) 
Farmers 843,840,000 175,547,000 30,763,500 0.824527 
Group of farmers 267,447,000 62,311,800 4,447,870 0.811038 
Retail 640,816,000 100,911,000 13,913,400 0.863951 
Supply Chain 1,743,103,000 338,769,000 49,124,770 0.833172 
 
Conclusion: 
 This research resulted in two supply chain models that are developed based on two types of contract 
farming. The first model of Banana supply chain (Model 1) is builded from plasma nucleus contract farming. 
The second model (Model 2) is based on sub-contract contract farming. The simulation using Vensim PLE 
software shows that the performance of the second model is better than the first model. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the method of contract farming will give positive results if they are only few players in the 
supply chain. 
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Appendix 1: Causal Loop Banana Supply Chain Model 
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Appendix 2: Banana supply chain model based on plasma-nucleus contract farming 
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Appendix 3: Banana supply chain model based on sub-contract contract farming 
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